Consumers in many markets are uncertain about firms' qualities and costs, so buy based on both the price and the quality inferred from it. Optimal pricing depends on consumer heterogeneity only when firms with higher quality have higher costs, regardless of whether costs and qualities are private or public. If better quality firms have lower costs, then good quality is sold cheaper than bad under private costs and qualities, but not under public. However, if higher quality is costlier, then price weakly increases in quality under both informational environments, but with asymmetric information, full separation cannot occur.
contrast, with public qualities and costs, better quality is priced higher. In markets where higher quality providers have larger costs, the price is constant or increases in quality under both informational environments. Under asymmetric information, firms with different quality levels pool at least partially when better quality is associated with a higher cost.
In the markets considered in this paper, competing firms independently draw a type, either good or bad. The good type has better quality than the bad, and in the main model also higher marginal cost. Consumers have heterogeneous valuations for the firms' products, with a greater valuation also implying a weakly larger premium for quality. Each player knows her own type, but other players only have a common prior over the types. The firms simultaneously set prices, which the consumers observe.
Then each consumer chooses either to buy from one of the firms or leave the market.
Consumers Bayes update their beliefs about the types of the firms based on the prices.
The equilibrium notion is perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE).
In equilibrium, price is above the competitive level, regardless of whether the good and bad types pool or the good quality firms signal their type by raising price. Separating equilibria do not exist and the Intuitive Criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987) eliminates all equilibria. Prices in pooling and semipooling equilibria exceed the cost of the good type, thus both types make positive profit.
By contrast, complete information Bertrand competition between identical firms, whether good or bad quality, leads to zero profit and a lower price than under incomplete information. Complete information competition between a good and a bad firm may raise price compared to private cost and quality, but one of the types still makes zero profit. The ex ante expected price may be higher or lower under complete information.
The ex ante price dispersion under public types exceeds that under private. If the cost and quality differences between the types vanish or the probability of the good type goes to zero, then the complete and incomplete information environments converge to the same price: the marginal cost of the bad type. The outcome in this paper is independent of whether the firms observe each other's cost or quality, but relies on consumers not observing these.
The equilibrium pricing differs from a privately informed monopolist, and from competition when consumers find it costly to learn prices. A monopolist with good quality signals its type by a high price. When observing the prices of competing firms is costly, the outcome under complete information is monopoly pricing (Diamond, 1971 ).
Incomplete information leads to above-monopoly pricing in costly search, except when quality and cost are negatively correlated, in which case pricing is competitive (Heinsalu, 2019) .
Literature. The signalling literature started from Spence (1973) , and price as a signal was studied in Milgrom and Roberts (1986) . In the present paper, the consumers are the receivers of the price signal, unlike in limit pricing (Milgrom and Roberts (1982) and the literature following) where the incumbent deters potential entrants from entering the market by signalling its low cost via a low price.
Bertrand competition has been combined with price signalling in Janssen and Roy (2015) , where consumers are homogeneous and firms may verifiably disclose their types.
In Sengupta (2015) , consumers may or may not value quality, but are otherwise homogeneous. Bertrand competing firms publicly invest to obtain a random private quality improvement, and signal quality via price. Hertzendorf and Overgaard (2001a) assume that one firm has high and the other low quality (firm types are perfectly negatively correlated, thus firms know each other's type) and that cost does not depend on quality. Firms may signal via price or advertising. Full separation requires advertising. Hertzendorf and Overgaard (2001b) ; Daughety and Reinganum (2007, 2008) consider Hotelling competition with quality differences (thus both horizontal and vertical differentiation). Daughety and Reinganum (2007, 2008) focus on symmetric separating equilibria. Hertzendorf and Overgaard (2001b) show the nonexistence of full separation, similarly to the current work.
If firm types only differ in their private marginal cost, but not quality, then the high cost type prices at its marginal cost, but the low cost type mixes over a range of prices strictly above its marginal cost and weakly below the price of the high-cost type (Spulber, 1995) .
The next section sets up the model and Section 2 characterises the equilibrium set, first when cost and quality are positively associated. Negative correlation is examined in Section 2.3.
Model
Two firms indexed by i ∈ {X, Y } compete. Each draws an i.i.d. type θ ∈ {G, B}, interpreted respectively as good and bad, with Pr(G) = µ 0 ∈ (0, 1). A continuum of consumers of mass 1, indexed by v ∈ [0, v], is distributed according to the strictly positive continuous pdf f v , with cdf F v . Consumer types are independent of firm types.
All players know their own type, but only have a common prior belief over the types of other players.
A type θ firm has marginal cost c θ , with c G > c B > 0. A type G firm has better quality: a type v consumer values a type B firm's product at v and G's product at
In this case, all consumers are willing to pay the same premium for quality. Assume v > c G ≥ h(0), so demand for the good type firm is positive. The previous assumption c B > 0 ensures that not all consumers buy from B under complete information. Firms and consumers are risk-neutral. Consumers have unit demand.
The firms observe their types and simultaneously set prices P X , P Y ∈ R + . A behavioural strategy of firm i maps its type to ∆R + . 2 The probability that firm i's type θ assigns to prices below P is denoted σ θ i (P ), so σ θ i (·) is the cdf of price. The corresponding pdf is denoted
After seeing the prices the firms, a consumer decides whether to buy from firm X
n} of a consumer maps his valuation and the prices to a decision.
The ex post payoff of a type θ firm if it sets price P and a mass D of consumers buy from it is (P − c θ )D. Total demand at price P and a fixed posterior belief µ of the
. The monopoly profit of type θ at P, µ is π m θ,µ (P ) = (P −c θ )D µ (P ). The complete-information monopoly profit π m B,0 (P ) is denoted π m B (P ), and π m G,1 (P ) denoted π m G (P ). The monopoly price is P m θ := arg max P π m θ (P ). Assume that π m θ (P ) is single-peaked in P . To avoid trivial separation, assume that
A consumer's belief about firm i conditional on price P and the firm's trategy σ * i is
A discontinuity of height h θ in the cdf σ θ * i is interpreted in the pdf as a Dirac δ function times h θ , thus makes the denominator of (1) positive. An jump in σ G * i (·, t), but not σ B * i (·, t) at P yields µ i (P, t) = 1, and a jump in σ B * i (·, t), but not σ G * i (·, t) results in µ i (P, t) = 0. If each σ θ * i has an atom of respective size h θ at P , then µ i (P, t) =
Finally, if the denominator of (1) vanishes, then choose an arbitrary belief.
The equilibrium notion is perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE), henceforth simply called equilibrium: each player maximises its payoff given its belief about the strategies of the others, and the beliefs are derived from Bayes' rule when possible.
The minimal and maximal price of firm i's type θ in a candidate equilibrium are denoted P iθ and P iθ , respectively.
Results
First the benchmark of complete information is considered, which illustrates some general features of the framework. After that, the case of private cost and quality is examined.
One general observation is that among the consumers who end up buying, the ones with a low valuation for good quality relative to bad sort to firms believed to have lower quality, while the high valuation consumers go to expected high quality. If the quality difference between the firm types is large compared to their cost difference and firms draw unequal types, then the low quality firm is left with zero demand. Similarly, if firm types differ and the variation in quality is small and in cost large, then the high quality firm receives no customers.
Benchmark: complete information
Symmetric firms with publicly known qualities price at their marginal cost, regardless of whether consumers are homogeneous or not and whether their quality premium h(v)−v is constant or increasing.
With asymmetric firms and a constant quality premium, one type prices at its marginal cost and the other higher by just enough to make the consumers indifferent. In asymmetric price competition when the quality premium increases in consumer valuation, define the indifferent consumer as 
Consumers with valuations above
v * (P G − P B ) buy from G, those below from B or not at all-the latter if v < v 0 (P G , P B ) := min {P B , h −1 (P G )}. A good type firm who expects P * B solves max P G (P G − c G )[1 − F v (v * (P G − P * B ))] and a bad type solves max P B (P B − c B )[F v (v * (P * G − P B )) − F v (P B )].
Incomplete information Bertrand competition
Results for the general case of an increasing quality premium for the good type are presented first, followed in Section 2.2.1 by derivations that require the additional restriction of a constant quality premium. The first lemma rules out some equilibria even when belief threats are possible. Proof. Suppose both types of both firms get zero demand in equilibrium. Then P > v for all prices. Both types deviate to P ∈ (c G , v) to obtain positive demand and profit even at the worst belief µ i (P ) = 0. If firm i's type G obtains positive demand, then any P iG that G sets is above c G , otherwise G would deviate to P = c G . Demand and profit are positive for iB, otherwise iB would deviate to P iG .
Suppose both types of firm j receive zero demand. Total demand at P < v is positive at any belief, so both types of i obtain positive demand and profit at any P i ∈ (c G , v).
Positive π * iθ implies P iθ > c θ . If iB partly separates, i.e. sets P iB with µ i (P iB ) = 0, then jB can get positive demand and profit by setting P j ∈ (c B , P iB ), regardless of µ j (P j ).
then for ǫ > 0 small, consumers with valuations v ∈ (c B , c B + ǫ) strictly prefer to buy from j at P j ∈ (c B , v) and any belief, rather than from i at P i0 and µ i (P i0 ) ≤ µ 0 . This makes jB deviate to P j ∈ (c B , v) to get positive profit.
Symmetric strategies imply that the firms split the total demand on average. Each firm's type G receives positive demand with probability at least µ 0 (when the other firm has type G). Then P G ≥ c G . Type B can imitate P G , thus π * iB > 0.
The results of Lemma 1 are tight, in the sense that there exist equilibria where one firm obtains zero demand, or both firms' good types zero profit. An equilibrium in which the good types receive zero profit is symmetric pooling on P 0 = c G , which exists 
Neither firm wants to deviate, because P = P i0 results in the worst belief and zero demand. Some non-pooling equilibria also involve zero demand for one firm, e.g. the above example can be modified so that firm Y (partly) separates. Any P Y receiving positive probability must satisfy
The next lemma proves that in any equilibrium, if demand for a firm's bad type is positive, then the bad type prices below the good and obtains greater demand, strictly so under (partial) separation. The proof combines the incentive constraints (ICs) of the types and is standard.
A higher demand and price would induce B to deviate to P iG , contradicting equilibrium.
An implication of Lemma 2 is that the supports of σ B * i and σ G * i have at most one price in common. Thus if one type at a firm semipools, i.e. only sets prices that the other type also chooses, then the semipooling type plays a pure strategy.
If the bad type at both firms (partly) separates, i.e. puts positive probability on prices at which belief is zero, then the bad types mix, with an atomless distribution on the partly separating prices. The reason is that belief threats do not deter a revealed bad type from undercutting an atom in the price distribution of the rival firm's bad type. Alternating undercutting would lead the bad types to set price equal to their marginal cost, making profits zero. However, Lemma 1 proved that if one firm partly separates, then the bad types make positive profit.
Constant quality premium
This section restricts attention to consumers who all have the same difference h(v)−v = ν in their valuations for good and bad quality. First, separating equilibria are ruled out. After that, prices in the remaining equilibria are characterised.
The following lemma shows that in any separating equilibrium, the bad type prices strictly above its marginal cost. The intuition is that otherwise the bad type would imitate G to make positive profit.
Lemma 3. In any separating equilibrium, P iB > c B , π * iB > 0 and P iG > P iB + ν, and if c G − c B ≤ ν, then P iG > c G and π * iG > 0 for i ∈ {X, Y }.
has the option to set P iG and make positive profit, so π * iB > 0. Then π * jB > 0, because jB can set P ∈ (c B , P iB ) and attract all customers from iB. Positive profit
Suppose P iG ≤ P iB + ν, then any consumer who buys at P iB also buys at P iG . This
The above-competitive pricing conclusion from Lemma 3 is further strengthened in Lemma 4, which shows that the bad types price higher than in monopoly.
Lemma 4. In any separating equilibrium,
then all consumers at iG who do not leave the market switch to jB given the chance.
If all customers at iG prefer to switch to P jB , then P jB ≥ min {P m B , P iB }, because at prices below P iB , firm j's type B is a monopolist and deviating only improves belief for B in a separating equilibrium. Thus demand after raising price from P jB is at least as great as for a monopolist known to be type B.
). In addition, some consumers may switch to j when facing P iB , but none switch at P m B ≤ P jB ≤ P jB < P jG − ν. Thus demand for iB increases relatively more than in a complete information monopoly environment, where cutting price from P iB to P m B is profitable. Therefore P iB ≤ P m B ≤ P jB . An implication of P iB ≤ P jB ≤ P jB < P jG − ν is that all consumers who do not leave the market switch from jG to P iB given the chance. At P iB < P jB , firm i's type B is a monopolist and raising price can only improve belief. The single-peaked π m B then yields P iB = P m B .
Both firms' B types choose an atomless price distribution (cdf σ B * j for firm j), because belief threats do not deter the bad type from undercutting an atom of the rival.
However, deviating from P iB > P m B to P m B increases demand from
, which is a greater increase than under complete information monopoly. By assumption, monopoly profit under complete information is single peaked, so the demand increase from P iB > P m B to P m B makes deviation profitable, contradicting the existence of a separating equilibrium.
In addition to separating equilibria, the above argument removes semipooling equilibria in which some price P iB is chosen by type B, but not G. The argument does not apply to equilibria where B only sets prices also chosen by G (but G may set some prices not chosen by B). In these, the strictly positive belief at any equilibrium price enables the use of belief threats to deter deviations, e.g. to P m B . Pooling fails the Intuitive Criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987) , because for any candidate pooling price, B does not want to deviate to prices above a cutoff, but G strictly prefers prices slightly above the cutoff. The Intuitive Criterion thus eliminates all equilibria and must be dropped.
In any equilibrium, the ICs imply P iG ≥ P iB for any P iθ in the support of σ θ * i , so there is at most one price that both types put positive probability on. Since any price chosen by the bad type also receives positive probability from the good type, the bad type plays a pure strategy in any equilibrium.
Demand is positive on the support of prices, otherwise B would deviate to c B + ǫ.
Positive demand and π * G ≥ 0 imply that the support of the equilibrium strategies is weakly above c G . The assumption v > c G implies that the prices are strictly above c G , because otherwise G would deviate to P = c G +ǫ even at the worst belief µ i (c G +ǫ) = 0.
Thus under incomplete information, price is always strictly above marginal cost for both types, which differs from a situation with public cost and quality, as shown in the next section.
Comparison to public positively correlated quality and cost
Incomplete information may increase or decrease prices in Bertrand competition, as shown in this section for positive correlation of cost and quality (the case of negative correlation is in Section 2.3.1). This indeterminate effect contrasts with costly search (Heinsalu, 2019) , where asymmetric information greatly enhances competition If instead c G − c B < ν, then the trading price is P G = c G with probability µ 2 0 , is P G = c B + ν > c G with probability 2µ 0 (1 − µ 0 ) and P B = c B with probability (1 − µ 0 ) 2 . By contrast, incomplete information implies that trade occurs at a (semi)pooling price P 0 > c G (with probability at least 1 − µ 2 0 ) or a semiseparating price P iGs > P 0 + (1 − µ 0 )ν. The ex ante expected price under incomplete information is higher than under complete iff either c G − c B ≥ ν or µ 0 / ∈ (µ 0 , µ 0 ) ⊂ (0, 1). Prices are always strictly above marginal cost when the marginal cost and quality are private, but when these are public, then at least one firm charges a price equal to its marginal cost.
Comparison to homogeneous consumers
If information is complete or cost and quality are negatively related (as in Section 2.3), then the strategies of the firms against homogeneous and heterogeneous consumers are the same.
Under incomplete information and positive correlation of cost and quality, Janssen and Roy (2015) initially claim the unique symmetric D1 equilibrium:
and all consumers buy.
From the second paragraph on, Janssen and Roy (2015) Proof of Proposition 2 says:
Nonnegative profit for G requires
, then there is a positive probability that P B is lower under incomplete information. As µ 0 → 0, the probability of trade at P B goes to 1 in both cases.
Negatively correlated cost and quality
In this section, the only differences from Section 2.2 are that a firm with good quality has a lower cost, the gains from trade are positive for a bad quality firm, but not all consumers buy at the bad type's cost, and the complete information monopoly profit of the good type increases in price for prices below the bad type's cost. Formally,
Analogously to Lemma 2, demand and price are monotone in type in any equilibrium, but due to c G < c B , the direction of the monotonicity switches. Denote by D i (P ) the equilibrium demand for firm i at price P .
Lemma 5. In any equilibrium for any P θ in the support of σ θ * i ,
The next lemma, similarly to Lemma 1, rules out some equilibria even when belief threats are possible. Proof. Suppose π * iG = 0 for both firms. Then for each firm and any P iG in the support of σ G * i , either P iG = 0 or D i (P iG ) = 0. If P iG = 0 ≤ P jG , then D i (0) > 0, so type B of firm i separates and sets P iB > 0. Then jG has probability 1 − µ 0 of facing iB with P iB > 0 and µ i (P iB ) = 0, so jG obtains positive demand and profit from P ∈ (0, P iB ) for any belief µ j (P ). Thus P jG > 0 and π * jG > 0. Suppose D i (P iG ) = 0, then D i (P ) = 0 for any P > 0, otherwise iG would deviate to P to get positive profit. Total demand D X (P ) + D Y (P ) is positive for any P < v for any beliefs µ X (P ), µ Y (P ), so if D i (P ) = 0, then D j (P ) > 0. Then both types of j get positive profit from anyP ∈ (c B , v), thus jB sets P jB > c B .
If jB partly separates, i.e. sets P jB with µ j (P jB ) = 0, then both types of firm i can get positive demand and profit by setting P i ∈ (c B , P jB ), regardless of µ i (P i ).
If jB (semi)pools with jG, then there exists P j0 chosen by both jB and jG with µ j (P j0 ) ≤ µ 0 . If µ 0 h(0) < c B , then for ǫ > 0 small, consumers with valuations v ∈ (0, ǫ) strictly prefer to buy from i at P i ∈ (0, v) and any belief, rather than from j at P j0 ≥ c B and µ j (P j0 ) ≤ µ 0 . This makes iG deviate to P i ∈ (0, v) to get positive profit.
If the firms play symmetric strategies, then consumers' beliefs are µ X (P ) = µ Y (P ) for any P chosen in equilibrium, thus D X (P ) = D Y (P ). From D X (P ) + D Y (P ) > 0 for any P < v, we get P iB ≥ c B , otherwise B would deviate to P d ≥ c B to obtain nonnegative profit. Type G can imitate P iB ≥ c B and receive D i (P iB ) > 0, thus
Similarly to Lemma 1, the results of Lemma 6 are tight. Asymmetric pooling (both types of firm i set P i0 > c B and both types of j set P j0 ∈ (c B , P i0 )) ensures zero profit for both types of j. Symmetric pooling on c B guarantees zero profit for the bad types.
Unlike under positive correlation of cost and quality, additional results do not require a constant quality premium h(v) − v. This is because all consumers prefer type G at P G ≤ P B . The Intuitive Criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987) selects a unique equilibrium, as shown below.
Theorem 7. In the unique equilibrium passing the Intuitive Criterion, P B = c B and
and the cdf of price is
Proof. First, rule out equilibria where some firm's type G gets zero profit. Lemma 6 proved that π * iG = P iG D i (P iG ) > 0 for at least one firm. Due to D i (P iG ) ≤ 1, any P iG in the support of σ G * i is bounded below by π * iG > 0. Denote by P iθ the lowest price in the support of σ θ * i . To apply the Intuitive Criterion to show π * jG > 0 for j = i, set µ j (P ) = 1 for P ∈ (0, min {P iG , c B }). Then all consumers with h(v) ≥ P buy from firm j at P . Suppose π * jG = 0, then jG strictly prefers P to its equilibrium price, but jB strictly prefers its equilibrium profit π * jB ≥ 0 to the negative profit from P < c B . This justifies µ j (P ) = 1 and removes any equilibrium with π * jG = 0. Second, rule out (partial) pooling. Positive profit for G implies positive demand, so pooling is only possible on P i0 ≥ c B , otherwise B would deviate to nonnegative profit. Define P * := sup {P ≤ P i0 : (P − c B )D 1 i (P ) < π * iB }. Due to π * iG > 0, we have D i (P 0 ) > 0, so P * ≥ c B . To apply the Intuitive Criterion to rule out (partial) pooling on P i0 ≥ c B , set µ i (P ) = 1 for all P < P * . Because iB puts positive probability on P i0 , we have µ i (P i0 ) < 1. Then for ǫ > 0 small enough, (P i0 − ǫ)D 1 (P i0 − ǫ) > P i0 D i (P i0 ), so G strictly prefers to deviate to P i0 − ǫ, but B strictly prefers the equilibrium. This justifies µ i (P i0 − ǫ) = 1 and removes (partial) pooling.
Combining separation of types with Lemma 5 shows P iG < P iB . All consumers strictly prefer P iG at µ i (P iG ) = 1 to P iB at µ i (P iB ) = 0, so iB only gets positive demand if firm j has type B. The bad types Bertrand compete, so undercut each other
The good types mix atomlessly by the standard reasoning for Bertrand competition with captive customers. Atoms invite undercutting. The good types' price competition cannot reach P = 0, because with positive probability, the other firm has type B and sets P B = c B . This makes type G strictly prefer P = c B − ǫ to P ≤ ǫ for ǫ > 0 small enough.
Denote by P iθ the supremum of the support of σ θ * i . Combining separation, P iG ≤ P iB and P iB = c B yields P iG ≤ c B for both firms.
has an atom at P iG and P iG = P jG , then set µ j (P jG − ǫ) = 1 for ǫ > 0 small enough and jG will deviate from P jG to undercut P iG . Type B of firm j strictly prefers not to set P jG − ǫ. Thus the Intuitive Criterion justifies µ j (P jG − ǫ) = 1 and eliminates equilibria with an atom at P iG = P jG < c B .
If σ G * i has no atom at P iG or P iG < P jG , then demand at P jG is only positive when firm i has type B. Set µ j (P ) = 1 for all P ∈ [P jG , c B ), then D j (P ) > 0 iff firm i has type B, in which case jG is a monopolist on P ∈ [P jG , c B ). By assumption, the complete information monopoly profit P D 1 (P ) strictly increases on [0, c B ], so G strictly prefers any P ∈ (P jG , c B ) to P jG . Type B strictly prefers not to set P < c B . Therefore the Intuitive Criterion justifies µ j (P ) = 1 and eliminates equilibria with P iG ≤ P jG < c B .
Suppose P iG < P jG , then set µ i (P ) = 1 for all P ∈ [P iG , P jG ]. Then for any P ∈ [P iG , P jG ), all customers who end up buying buy from i. Because P D 1 (P ) strictly increases on [0, c B ], type G of firm i will deviate from P iG to any P ∈ [P iG , P jG ). This rules out P iG < P jG .
Price P iG ≤ P jG attracts all customers with h(v) ≥ P iG . Profit from P iG is
in the support of σ G * i , which determines firm j's mixing cdf σ G * j by P
The equilibrium selected by the Intuitive Criterion in Theorem 7 is similar to the symmetric equilibrium in the homogeneous consumer case studied in Janssen and Roy ). If the complete information monopoly price P m G of the good type is below h(c B ), then G sets P m G , type B gets zero demand and may set any P ≥ h −1 (P m G ). This outcome is similar to the case of a constant quality premium.
The more interesting case is P m G > h(c B ), 3 where type G raises price until the consumers with the lowest valuations above c B prefer to switch to B charging P B = c B .
These switchers are captive for type B, inducing it to raise price above c B , which in turn loosens the incentive constraint of type G, allowing it to raise price. The good type ends up pricing between h(c B ) and P m G , and the bad type strictly above c B . This result is similar to the above-competitive pricing found in Section 2.1 for positively correlated public cost and quality, but differs from privately known cost and quality.
Unlike with public types, private information about negatively correlated cost and quality leads to P G < P B = c B , with P G > c G = 0, and if the firms have different types, then demand for the bad type is zero (Theorem 7). The reason is that the good type signals its private quality by reducing price. Overall, price may end up higher or lower than under public cost and quality.
Conclusion
Customer heterogeneity turns out to be important for optimal pricing decisions when better quality producers have higher costs, independently of private information about cost and quality. When higher quality costs less, firms should price similarly when facing heterogeneous consumers as when homogeneous. A firm may therefore estimate the value of gathering information on consumer preferences using its own and competitors' cost and quality data, if available.
Asymmetric information about qualities and costs substantively affects pricing only when higher quality firms have a lower marginal cost. If smaller cost implies better quality, then a low price can credibly signal quality. This is because cutting price reduces the profit less for a firm with lower cost. In some situations, other costly signals of quality are feasible, for example advertising or warranties, but in other markets such as insurance, warranties are uncommon. Even if available, warranties or advertisements may not be the best way to signal-price cuts may be a cheaper or more accurate way for a high quality firm to distinguish itself.
A low price used as a signal is similar to limit pricing, i.e. a monopolist keeping potential entrants out of the market by convincing them of its low cost by way of a low price. In limit pricing, charging a low price is anti-competitive, unlike in this paper.
One policy implication of this paper is that a regulator maximising total or consumer surplus should discourage quality certification (and other methods to make quality public) when cost and quality are negatively correlated across firms and private. However, when better quality producers have higher costs, publicising quality may increase or decrease price and total and consumer surplus. Making information complete improves welfare ex ante when firms' types are unknown if the cost difference between firms is expected to be large relative to the quality difference or consumers are nearly certain of the firms' types. Thus in mature industries, certification is likely to increase surplus.
If the regulator knows the firms' costs and qualities, then welfare-maximisation suggests that with symmetric firms, this information should be revealed. If the firms differ and the better quality producer has a lower cost, then revelation reduces surplus.
With asymmetric firms where the higher quality one has a greater cost, the price effect of making information public depends on the relative qualities and costs.
The comparison between positively and negatively associated cost and quality suggests other policy implications. To maximise welfare under privately known cost and quality, the correlation between these should be made negative. Two ways to do this are to reward good quality (industry prizes for the best product) and punish for flawed products (fines, lawsuits). The quality of larger firms should be checked the most frequently to give them the greatest motive to improve it, because they are likely the low cost producers. Firms whose quality and cost are uncertain to consumers (e.g. startups) should receive targeted assistance with cost reduction if their quality is high, and with quality improvement if their costs are low.
If qualities and costs are negatively associated and private, then a merger to duopoly need not increase prices by much. Thus the optimal antitrust policy depends on the correlation of cost and quality in an industry.
